The stochastic game Γ under consideration is repetition of the same stage game G which is played on each stage with different coalitional partitions. The transition probabilities over the coalitional structures of stage game depends on the initial stage game G in game Γ. The payoffs in stage games (which is a simultaneous game with a given coalitional structure) are computed as components of the generalized PMS-vector [2], [3] . The total payoff of each player in game Γ is equal to the mathematical expectation of payoffs in different stage games G (mathematical expectation of the components of PMS-vector). The concept of solution for such class of stochastic game is proposed and the existence of this solution is proved.
Introduction
In the papers [1] a class of multistage stochastic games with different coalitional partitions where the transition probability from some coalitional game to another depends from coalitional partition in the initial game and from the n-tuple of strategies which realizes in initial game is examined. A new mathematical method for solving stochastic coalitional games, based on constructing Nash equilibrium (NE) in a stochastic game similarly scheme of constructing of absolute NE in a multistage game with perfect information [4] , [5] , and based on calculation of the generalized PMS-value introduced in [2] , [3] , for the first time, is proposed along with the proof of the solution existence. In this paper transition probability from some coalitional game to another depends only from coalitional partition in the initial game. So the matrix transition probabilities which is constant during of whole multistage game is form.
Remind that coalitional game is a game where players are united in fixed coalitions in order to obtain the maximum possible payoff, and stochastic game is a multistage game with random transitions from state to state, which is played by one or more players.
State of problem
Suppose finite graph tree Γ = (Z, L) , where Z is the set of vertices in the graph and L is point-to-set mapping, defined on the set Z: L (z) ⊂ Z, z ∈ Z. Finite graph tree with the initial vertex z 0 will be denoted by Γ (z 0 ).
In each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ) simultaneous N -person game is defined in a normal form
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players identical for all vertices z ∈ Z; X j is the set of pure strategies x
For each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ) by matrix of transition probabilities the probabilities p (z, y) of transition to the next vertices y ∈ L (z) of the graph Γ (z 0 ) are defined:
The game defined on the finite graph tree Γ (z 0 ) with initial vertex z 0 is called the finite step coalitional stochastic gameΓ (z 0 ) with constant matrix of transition probabilities:
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players identical for all vertices z ∈ Z; Γ (z 0 ) is the graph tree with initial vertex z 0 ; {G (z, Σ z )} z∈Z is the simultaneous coalitional l-person game defined in a normal form in each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ); {p (z, y)} z∈Z , y∈L(z) , is the realization probability of the coalitional game G (y , Σ y ) at the vertex y ∈ L (z) under condition that the simultaneous game G (z , Σ z ) was realized at the previous step at vertex z; kΓ is the finite and fixed number of steps in the stochastic gameΓ (z 0 ); the step k , k = 0, kΓ at the vertex z k ∈ Z is defined according to the condition of z k ∈ (L (z 0 )) k , i. e. the vertex z k is reached from the vertex z 0 in k stages.
States in the multistage stochastic gameΓ are vertices of graph tree z ∈ Z with the defined coalitional partitions in each vertex Σ z , i. e. pair (z , Σ z ). GameΓ is stochastic, because transition from state (z , Σ z ) to state (y , Σ y ), y ∈ L (z), is defined by the given probability p (z, y).
Multistage stochastic coalitional gameΓ (z 0 ) is realized as follows. At moment t 0 the gameΓ (z 0 ) starts at the vertex z 0 , where the game G (z 0 , Σ z 0 ) with a certain coalitional partition Σ z 0 is realized. Players choose their strategies, thus n-tuple of strategies x z 0 is formed. Then on the next stage with given probabilities p (z 0 , z 1 ) the transition from vertex z 0 on the graph tree Γ (z 0 ) to the game
players choose their strategies again, n-tuple of strategies x z 1 is formed. Then from vertex z 1 ∈ L (z 0 ) the transition to the vertex z 2 ∈ (L (z 0 )) 2 is made, again n-tuple of strategies x z 2 is formed. This process continues until at the end of the game the vertex z kΓ ∈ (L (z 0 )) kΓ , L z kΓ = ∅ is reached.
Denote byΓ (z) the subgame of gameΓ (z 0 ), starting at the vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ), i. e. at coalitional game G (z , Σ z ). Obviously the subgamẽ Γ (z) is a stochastic game as well.
Denote by: u z j (·) the strategy of player j, j = 1, n , in the subgameΓ (z), which to each vertex y ∈ Z assigns the strategy x y j of player j in each simultaneous game G (y, Σ y ) at all vertices y ∈ Γ (z), i. e. Then PMS-vector in the NE in mixed strategies in the game
If the calculation of PMS-vector is difficult, then any other "optimal" solution can be proposed to be used as a PMS-solution, for example, Pareto-optimality or Nash arbitration scheme [6] .
We apply the known algorithm of constructing NE n-tuple in a stochastic coalitional game to the stochastic coalitional gameΓ(z 0 ) with constant matrix of transition probabilities [1] .
Conclusion
In this paper the new algorithm of solving of finite step coalitional stochastic game with constant matrix of transition probabilities is proposed. A mathematical method for solving stochastic coalitional games with constant matrix of transition probabilities is based on calculation of the generalized PMS-value.
